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Abstract 
This study examines the firm size distribution of US banks and credit unions. A truncated 
lognormal distribution describes the size distribution, measured using assets data, of a large 
population of small, community-based commercial banks. The size distribution of a smaller 
but increasingly dominant cohort of large banks, which operate a high-volume low-cost retail 
banking model, exhibits power-law behaviour. There is a progressive increase in skewness 
over time, and Zipf’s Law is rejected as a descriptor of the size distribution in the upper tail. 
By contrast, the asset size distribution of the population of credit unions conforms closely to 
the lognormal distribution.  
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 The Size Distribution of US Banks and Credit Unions 
 
1. Introduction 
This study examines the empirical size distribution of US banks and credit unions. It 
is well known that most empirical firm-size distributions are highly skewed. If firm sizes are 
subject to proportional random growth, consistent with Gibrat’s Law so that log sizes follow 
random walks, a lognormal cross-sectional firm-size distribution emerges over time (Gibrat, 
1931; Sutton, 1997). There is, however, extensive evidence that the lognormal provides a 
poor approximation to empirical firm-size distributions in the upper tail, which typically 
exhibit greater skewness than is consistent with lognormality. Certain modifications to 
Gibrat’s Law, however, are capable of producing a cross-sectional size distribution that 
exhibits power-law behaviour.
i
 A strand in the empirical literature examines the application 
of lognormal and power-law distributions to cross-sectional firm-size data (Simon and 
Bonnini, 1958; Quandt, 1966; Lucas, 1978; Cabral and Mata, 2003). 
Pareto (1897) describes the distribution of a collection of N subjects ranked by size, 
where the density function, denoted f( ), obeys a power law in the upper tail: 
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where X is size,  is the size threshold above which the Pareto distribution applies, and  is 
constant. Zipf’s Law describes the special case =1 (Zipf, 1949). Axtell (2001) reports that 
Zipf’s Law provides a close approximation to the entire size distribution of US 
manufacturing firms.
ii
  
The recent financial crisis has heightened interest in the role of large banks in the 
financial system. Some recent bank efficiency studies, based on data from the 1990s and 
2000s, have challenged the earlier received wisdom, derived mainly from the analysis of 
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1980s data, that scale economies were rapidly exhausted beyond relatively modest bank sizes. 
For example, Hughes and Mester (2011) and Wheelock and Wilson (2012) report evidence of 
scale economies at all sizes, which cannot be attributed solely to an implicit “too big to fail” 
(TBTF) subsidy. Across the empirical banking literature as a whole, however, the evidence as 
to whether large banks operate at lower average costs than their smaller counterparts is rather 
weak and contradictory (Davies and Tracey, 2012). 
Awareness that the failure of one large bank could tip many other banks into default is 
widely perceived to have contributed to the emergence among depositors and investors of a 
TBTF mentality: a presumption that the regulator would intervene and bail out a TBTF bank, 
rather than permit failure. Steps taken by governments in the US, Western Europe and 
elsewhere at the height of the crisis in 2008 to bail out numerous large banks that would 
otherwise have become insolvent have heightened concerns over TBTF. Among the 
consequences is a weakening of market discipline, with little incentive for depositors and 
investors to monitor risk-taking. Competition is distorted, because the TBTF bank benefits 
from an implicit safety-net insurance public subsidy (O’Hara and Shaw, 1990; Morgan and 
Stiroh, 2005; Mishkin, 2006; Schmid and Walter, 2009; Brewer and Jagtiani, 2012).    
Historically, geographic and product market regulations have constrained the growth 
of US banks, and the largest US banks were small by comparison with the largest European 
and Japanese banks (DeYoung, 2010). Since the 1980s, however, financial deregulation has 
eased many of the earlier constraints on growth.
iii
 Consolidation through M&A (merger and 
acquisition) reduced the number of commercial banks, from around 14,400 in 1980 to around 
6,400 in 2010.
iv
 Industry concentration measured, for example, using the ten-firm 
concentration ratio for the assets of all separately constituted commercial banks (irrespective 
of ownership), has increased from 0.300 in 1980 to 0.555 in 2010. It seems likely that many 
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of the banks that disappeared were simply too small to compete effectively in a less heavily 
regulated and more highly competitive banking market.    
Despite the increasing dominance of large banks, and their importance for financial 
stability, to our knowledge only one previous study has examined the statistical 
characteristics of the firm-size distribution for banks. Janicki and Prescott (2006), henceforth 
JP, report estimation results obtained by fitting a Pareto distribution to the upper tail of assets, 
deposits, loans and employees data for US commercial banks and Bank Holding Companies 
(BHC) at ten- or fifteen-year intervals between 1960 and 2005. Zipf’s Law is found to 
provide a close approximation to the data in all of the years examined except 2005, for which 
the upper tail is heavier than is consistent with Zipf’s Law.  
An important technical limitation of the methodology used by JP is the imposition of 
an arbitrarily chosen value for the threshold parameter , corresponding to the asset size of 
the bank ranked 3,000th in the firm-size distribution. A consequence of this limitation is that 
JP are unable to provide an accurate description of changes in the shape of the firm-size 
distribution, especially changes in the location of , over time. The present study overcomes 
this limitation, by applying an estimation method that permits a choice between fitting the 
lognormal distribution over the entire range of firm sizes, and fitting a combination of a 
truncated lognormal distribution for smaller firms and a Pareto distribution for firms above 
the size threshold . In the latter case, the choice of  is determined by the data, and  is 
permitted to vary over time. It is shown that the true location of  for commercial banks is, in 
fact, considerably nearer the upper end of the firm size distribution than the arbitrary location 
assumed by JP; and that the Pareto upper tail describes the size distribution of a 
correspondingly smaller proportion of the population. Between 1995 and 2010, for example, 
the proportion of the population of commercial banks represented by the Pareto upper tail fell 
from 6.2% (611 banks) to 2.8% (180 banks). Owing to the highly skewed nature of the firm-
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size distribution, however, these 180 banks accounted for more than 85% of banking industry 
assets in 2010.  
This study also compares the size distribution of commercial banks with that of (not-
for-profit) credit unions. The growth of credit unions is constrained by common-bond 
restrictions on the groups with which they are permitted to transact, despite moves in recent 
years towards the easing of several of the restrictions. It is of interest to examine whether the 
combination of a non-profit orientation and a restrictive regulatory environment generates a 
similar or differently-shaped firm-size distribution over the long term. The empirical results 
suggest that the shape of the size distribution does, indeed, differ markedly between 
commercial banks and credit unions. The size distribution of commercial banks is described 
by a truncated lognormal distribution and a Pareto distribution in the upper-tail. There is a 
pronounced trend in the upper-tail shape parameter that reflects an increase in skewness over 
time. By contrast, the lognormal distribution provides an accurate description of the entire 
size distribution of credit unions throughout the observation period. 
The rest of this study is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the estimation 
method. Section 3 reports estimation results for the population of US commercial banks for 
the period 1976-2010. Section 4 reports an application of the same methods to the population 
of US credit unions over the period 1995-2010. Finally, Section 5 summarizes and concludes.      
 
2.  Estimation Method 
Let Xi denote the assets of firm i in a particular year, and let xi=ln(Xi). Let X[i] denote 
the value of the i’th observation when the firms are ranked in descending order of asset size, 
so X[1]  X[2]  ...  X[n], and let x[i]=ln(X[i]). Let k = X[k] denote some threshold value of k 
that is, initially, assumed to be pre-selected, and let k = x[k]. 
We examine two candidate distributions for Xi: 
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(i) xi ~ N(0,
2
0 ) for all i 
(ii) xi ~ TN(k, 
2
k , –, k) for xi < k, and Xi ~ Par(k, k) for Xi  k  
In (i), the distribution of Xi is lognormal with mean and variance parameters 0 and 
2
0 , for all i. In (ii), the distribution of Xi is truncated lognormal with mean and variance 
parameters k and 
2
k , and an upper truncation point k, for Xi < k; and Pareto with location 
and shape parameters k and k, for Xi  k.  
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For (ii), the likelihood function that would be formed over the two segments of the 
distribution is discontinuous at the truncation point k. Accordingly, we estimate the 
parameters k, 
2
k , k, k and k in two stages. 
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where  is the standard normal distribution function. The estimates 
kˆ  and 
2
kˆ  are obtained 
by selecting the pair of values for k and 
2
k  that minimise the distance function 
22
ki
2
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Stage 2 
Estimation of k proceeds by applying maximum likelihood to the observations X[1],...,X[k], 
which are assumed to follow the Pareto distribution. The log-likelihood function takes the 
form ])/X)(/ln[(
)1(
k
k
1i ]i[kk
k 
   . Zipf’s Law describes the special case k=1, for which 
Stage 2 (the estimation of k) is not required. A grid-search is used to identify the value of k 
that maximises the pseudo-log-likelihood function, constructed as follows: 
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In the special case described by Zipf’s Law, 
kˆ  is replaced by one in [4]. 
By convention, the rank-size relationship is commonly depicted using a plot of log 
rank against log size. If asset sizes follow a Pareto distribution in the upper tail, the log rank-
log size relationship is linear over the relevant range of asset-size values, with a slope of –k. 
This follows from 
kk
]j[
]j[kx
Xkdz)z(fkj
   
where j  k is the continuous analogue of the (discrete) rank, and f is the density function of 
the Pareto distribution. Applying a log transformation yields 
ln(j) = ln(k) + kk – kx[j] 
In the special case described by Zipf’s Law, the slope of the log rank-log size plot is –1.  
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3. The Size Distribution of US Banks 
The data source for the empirical analysis of the assets size distribution of US 
commercial banks is Reports on Condition and Income (Call Reports) provided by the 
Federal Financial Institution Examination Council. Data on savings banks, savings and loan 
associations, investment banks, mutual banks and credit-card banks are excluded. Table 1 
reports descriptive statistics based on the fourth-quarter reports at five-year intervals from 
1980 to 2010. Panels A and B report an analysis in which commercial banks are the units of 
observation, disregarding ownership. Accordingly, in the ‘all commercial banks’ population, 
commercial banks that are constituents of the same BHC are treated as separate observations. 
Most previous studies of the evolution of the US banking industry focus on banks, rather than 
BHC (Berger et al., 1995; Jones and Critchfield, 2005). In part this is because many price and 
non-price decisions are taken at bank level. Regulation concerned with competition and anti-
trust issues also tends to focus on the bank, and not the BHC.
v
  
Table 1 Panel A reports summary descriptive statistics for the firm-size distribution 
based on balance-sheet assets. The data are yearly for the period 1976-2010, but to conserve 
space Table 1, and subsequent tables, report results only at five-year intervals during 1980-
2010. The number of commercial banks fell steadily throughout this period, owing primarily 
to M&A. Industry concentration fell slightly during the 1980s, but increased during the 1990s 
and 2000s. These trends are apparent in the five-, ten- and twenty-firm concentration ratios, 
and the Herfindahl index.  
The results reported in Panel A based on balance-sheet assets do not fully reflect the 
lending capacity of banks or BHC that enter into commitments that do not appear on their 
balance sheets, such as guaranteed lines of credit upon which borrowers can draw at their 
discretion. Before 1990, most US banks did not report off balance sheet (OBS) commitments 
in their company accounts; but subsequently these commitments have been reported widely. 
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In order to render the OBS data compatible with the balance-sheet assets data, individual 
OBS items are converted into credit equivalents, which are then added to balance-sheet assets 
to create a total size measure for each bank that reflects its total lending commitments.
vi
 
Table 1 Panel B reports summary descriptive statistics for the firm-size distribution during 
1990-2010, based on the sum of balance-sheet assets and OBS credit equivalents. The 
inclusion of the latter increases the measured average bank size by around 12% in 1990, and 
77% in 2010. The concentration measures and Herfindahl index are all substantially larger 
when OBS commitments are included, indicating that the latter are concentrated 
disproportionately among the larger banks. 
For purposes of comparison with the JP study, Table 1 Panels C and D report an 
analysis in which ‘ownership groups’ are the units of observation. The data for any banks that 
are constituents of the same BHC are aggregated to form a single observation, while the data 
for independently-owned commercial banks are retained as separate observations.
vii
 BHC 
accounts report data that reflects the summation of both banking and non-banking business. 
Since the 1990s, and especially since the passing of the Gramm Leach Bliley Act in 1999, the 
importance of non-banking business to BHC has increased, especially for larger entities 
(Avraham et al. 2012; Copeland, 2012). In 2008, investment banks such as Goldman Sachs 
and Morgan Stanley (which hold the bulk of their assets outside banking subsidiaries) 
converted to BHC status. In order to avoid the inclusion of non-banking assets, bank 
subsidiaries only are included in the construction of aggregated BHC data.
viii
 Panel C reports 
summary statistics for the firm-size distribution during 1980-2010 based on BHC balance-
sheet assets. Panel D reports the equivalent results for 1990-2010 obtained by adding OBS 
credit equivalents to balance-sheet assets. 
Table 2 reports the empirical analysis of patterns in the assets size distribution of US 
banks. As before, Panel A reports the results for ‘all commercial banks’ based on balance-
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sheet assets (1980-2010), and Panel B reports the results for ‘all commercial banks’ based on 
the sum of assets and OBS credit equivalents (1990-2010 only). Panels C and D report the 
equivalent results for the ‘ownership groups’ definition. Figures 1 and 2 present summary 
yearly results for the entire observation period, in the form of plots of the estimated k and k 
based on balance-sheet assets. The comparison between the two candidate distributions, (i) 
lognormal and (ii) truncated lognormal with Pareto upper tail, favours (ii) in every year 
reported in Table 3, and in all of the intermediate years that are not reported. A Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test rejects the null hypothesis of lognormality for the entire size distribution in 
every case.
ix
  
For the ‘all commercial banks’ population and balance-sheet assets, Table 2 Panel A 
indicates that the percentile of the asset size distribution at which the estimated threshold 
parameter k is located varies between a minimum value of 95.5 and a maximum of 96.8 
between 1976 and 1990, when there is no discernible trend. Between 1991 and 1995 this 
percentile drops to 93.8; but from 1996 onwards there is a steady trend in the reverse 
direction. The percentile of the asset size distribution at which k is located attains its highest 
value of 97.2 in 2010 (see Figure 1). Despite the decrease in the number of banks located in 
the upper tail, their share of total assets, measured by the k-firm concentration ratio CRk, 
increases steadily over the observation period, from 0.719 in 1980 to 0.856 in 2010. While 
the Pareto upper tail comprises only 2.8% of all commercial banks operating in 2010, these 
banks account for more than 85% of total banking-sector assets.  
The estimated upper-tail shape parameter kˆ  is below one, but not significantly 
different from one, for 1976 and 1977, the first two years in the data set. For every 
subsequent year, however, the estimated k is significantly below one; and there is a 
downward trend that is most pronounced during the 1980s and early 1990s. Accordingly, 
Zipf’s Law is rejected as a descriptor of the size distribution in the upper tail, in favour of a 
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Pareto power-law distribution with a heavier upper tail than would be expected under Zipf’s 
Law. Relative to the rest of the distribution, the weight of the upper tail has increased since 
the mid-1990s, reflected in the downward trend in the estimated k. The results based on the 
sum of balance-sheet assets and OBS credit equivalents, reported in Table 2 Panel B, indicate 
a similar downward trend in the estimated k during the period 1990-2010.  
 For the ‘ownership groups’ population and balance-sheet assets, a trend in the rank at 
which the estimated threshold k is located is apparent from the mid-1980s onwards in Table 
2 Panel C. Over the entire period 1976-2010, the percentile of the asset size distribution at 
which the threshold value of k is located attains a minimum value of 94.4 in 1983 and a 
minimum of 97.6 in 2008. The estimated upper-tail shape parameter k is significantly below 
one in every year. Again Zipf’s Law is rejected as a descriptor of the size distribution in the 
upper tail of the ‘ownership groups’ population, in favour of a Pareto power-law distribution 
with a heavier tail than is required for conformity with Zipf’s Law. As before the results 
based on the sum of balance-sheet assets and OBS credit equivalents, reported in Table 2 
Panel D, indicate a similar pattern for the period 1990-2010. 
 Figure 3 reports scatter plots, on a logarithmic scale, of the relationship between rank 
and asset size, for the ‘all commercial banks’ population in 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2010. In 
each case, the theoretical rank-size plot for a lognormal distribution with mean and variance 
corresponding to the sample estimates over the entire sample is located (thin dotted line). The 
equivalent plots for the upper tail, assuming banks larger than the estimated size threshold k 
follow the Pareto distribution in accordance with either Zipf’s Law, or the fitted shape 
parameter k, are also located (thick dotted line, and continuous line, respectively). 
Accordingly, the continuous line represents the maximum likelihood estimate of the Pareto 
upper tail, while the thick dotted line represents an upper tail with a shape parameter in 
accordance with Zipf’s Law.x The maximum likelihood estimates provide a close, if less than 
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perfect, representation of the upper tail, with a slight tendency to overstate the number of 
firms at the top end of the distribution (more so in 1980, 1990 and 2000 than in 2010).     
 Table 3 reports summary results for three alternative firm size measures: loans, 
deposits and employees.
xi
 As before, in every estimation the choice between the two 
candidate distributions favours (ii) truncated lognormal with Pareto upper tail. For each size 
measure and for each of the two population definitions, the threshold value of k and the 
estimated upper-tail shape parameter k are reported. The results are similar to those for the 
assets size measure. In all cases k diminishes over the entire observation period, and the 
estimated k shows a tendency to decrease in magnitude.
xii
  
 The notion that the commercial banks population divides into two discrete categories 
defined by scale is consistent with the characterization of the evolution of the US commercial 
banking industry described by DeYoung, Hunter and Udell (2004), henceforth DHU. Prior to 
the 1980s, the industry was dominated by a large number of small, community-based banks, 
offering differentiated or customized loan products and a highly personalized service, and 
operating at relatively high unit cost. Subsequently, deregulation and technological change 
created new strategic opportunities for growth that were realized initially by within-market 
M&A, and later by larger-scale M&A that greatly extended the market reach of the merged 
entities.
xiii
 Those banks that grew most aggressively came to bear less resemblance to 
community banks, by adjusting to a high-volume low-cost retail banking model reliant on 
scale economies, in which automated production and distribution processes deliver 
standardized products and services at low unit cost. A consequence has been the emergence 
of “... a strategic wedge between the large and growing banks on the one hand and the smaller 
community banks on the other” (op cit, p110). Although many community banks have also 
grown, they continue to operate under a traditional high unit-cost and high value-added retail 
banking model. 
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A rule-of-thumb used by DHU defines community banks as those with assets below 
around USD 1 billion (2001 prices). This figure corresponds quite closely to the threshold 
asset size value of USD 1.2 billion for the year 2000 that is quoted in Table 2, below which 
the fitted size distribution is truncated lognormal and above which Pareto. According to Table 
2, the cut-off asset size value that separates the smaller community banks from the larger 
ones that have outgrown community status increased to around USD 2 billion in 2005, and 
USD 3 billion in 2010 (all values in current prices). The number of banks in the upper tail fell 
from 325 (96.1 percentile of the assets-size distribution) in 2000 to 267 (96.4 percentile) in 
2005, and 180 (97.2 percentile) in 2010. 
 
4. The Size Distribution of US Credit Unions 
Credit unions are cooperative not-for-profit financial organizations under mutual 
ownership that provide basic banking services to their members. A credit union’s worth is 
based on book value rather than market value. Accordingly, credit unions are not subject to 
market-driven expectations for growth and earnings performance. Credit unions are subject to 
a common bond, which defines the groups with which each credit union is permitted to 
transact. The common bond might be defined by residence in a particular geographic area, 
employment in a particular company or industry, or religious or some other affiliation.  
Deregulation has, to a limited extent, eased the constraint on the growth of individual credit 
unions imposed by the common bond. The Credit Union Membership Access Act of 1998 
permitted federally-chartered credit unions to operate with a multiple common bond, or to 
transact with any resident of a geographical area defined as a ‘community’. Neither banks nor 
credit unions face restrictions on the prices they charge for specific products. Credit unions, 
however, face some restrictions on their volumes of small-business lending, while banks are 
subject to limits on lending concentration. In common with commercial banking, the US 
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credit union industry has experienced significant consolidation through M&A in recent 
decades.
xiv
  
The data source for the empirical analysis of the assets size distribution of US credit 
unions is the ‘5300 Call Reports’, published by the National Credit Union Association 
(NCUA). Table 4 reports an analysis of patterns in the assets size distribution of US credit 
unions, based on the December reports at five-year intervals within the period 1995-2010. A 
steady decline in the number of credit unions, which has been underway since the 1970s, has 
seen numbers fall from around 11,700 in 1995 to around 7,300 in 2010. Consistent with the 
pattern for US banks, industry concentration, measured by the five-, ten- and twenty-firm 
concentration ratios and the Herfindahl index, has increased steadily throughout this period; 
but concentration remains considerably lower than it is for commercial banks.  
The comparison between the two candidate distributions, (i) lognormal and (ii) 
truncated lognormal with Pareto upper-tail, favours (i) in each of the years reported in Table 
1, and in all of the intermediate years that are not reported. For most years, the estimation 
procedure fails to identify a value of k for which the maximised value of the pseudo-log-
likelihood function in (ii) is larger than the corresponding value in (i); and for those years for 
which such a value of k is identified, the difference between the maximized value of the 
pseudo-log-likelihood function for (i) and (ii) is marginal and not statistically significant on 
any conventional criterion. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test fails to reject the null hypothesis of 
lognormality at the 0.01 level for all years within the observation period; although there are 
five rejections at the 0.05 level (for years 2003-2006 inclusive, and 2010). Figure 4 shows the 
scatter plot of the relationship between log rank and log asset size for 2010. Only three credit 
unions, each with assets of more than USD 10 billion, were larger than would be expected if 
the entire asset-size distribution were lognormal in 2010.
xv
 Overall the lognormal distribution 
appears to provide a satisfactory, but not a perfect, representation of the asset size distribution 
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of US credit unions. There is no evidence of conformity with a power law in the upper tail of 
this firm-size distribution.  
 
5.  Conclusion 
This study examines the application of lognormal and power-law distributions to 
cross-sectional firm-size data for US commercial banks and credit unions.  For banks, the 
firm size distribution is accurately described by a truncated lognormal distribution with a 
Pareto or power-law distribution in the upper tail. Zipf’s Law is rejected as a descriptor of the 
firm size distribution in the upper tail for all except the first two years of a 1976-2010 
observation period. A trend in the upper-tail shape parameter reflects a progressive increase 
in skewness over time. In 2010, the Pareto upper tail contains only 2.8% of all commercial 
banks, but these banks account for 85% of total banking-sector assets.  
Deregulation and financial liberalization has eliminated many of the constraints on the 
growth of US banks that were effective prior to the 1990s. The question as to whether the 
existence of very large banks is justified on efficiency grounds, with economies of scale 
yielding average cost savings at the upper end of the firm-size distribution, remains largely 
unresolved in the empirical banking literature. The suggestion that governments would 
always bail out “too big to fail” (TBTF) large banks for fear of a contagion effect that could 
precipitate systemic failure, seemingly more than amply justified by events at the height of 
the financial crisis at the end of the 2000s, has raised concerns that large banks are subject to 
inadequate competitive or market discipline. The descriptive form of evidence presented in 
this paper does not allow us to resolve these crucial issues. However, a descriptive analysis 
demonstrating that the commercial banks population divides into two distinct categories 
defined by scale is suggestive and consistent with a characterization of the US commercial 
banking industry that distinguishes between a large but steadily shrinking population of small 
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competitive community-based banks, and a smaller but increasingly dominant group of large 
banks operating in an environment in which the intensity of competition is moderated by the 
existence of an implicit TBTF public subsidy.   
By contrast, the lognormal distribution describes accurately the entire firm-size 
distribution of credit unions throughout most of a 1995-2010 observation period, when there 
is no evidence of power-law behaviour in the upper tail, despite some indications of 
deterioration in the goodness-of-fit for the lognormal distribution during the second half of 
this period. Overall the extent of departure from lognormality in the entire credit union firm-
size distribution appears rather modest. We conjecture that the combination of a non-profit 
orientation and a more restrictive regulatory environment accounts for the evolution of a 
firm-size distribution for all credit unions that is similar to that of the smaller commercial 
banks, but markedly different to that of the larger banks at the upper end of the size 
distribution.   
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Endnotes
                                                 
i
 These include: proportional growth subject to a reflecting lower barrier (a minimum size threshold beneath 
which no firm can fall); and proportional growth with deaths at a rate that is inversely proportional to size, and 
births at a constant size (Gabaix, 2009). 
 
ii
 See also Stanley et al. (1995) and Growiec et al. (2008). For empirical evidence on the size distribution of 
cities, regions and countries, see Gabaix (1999a,b); Eeckhout (2004); Rose (2006);and  Luttmer (2007). 
 
iii
 For example, the McFadden Act of 1927, which prohibited interstate branch banking, was repealed by the 
Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994; and the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, 
which prohibited commercial banks from transacting other financial services including investment banking and 
insurance, was repealed by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999. Berger et 
al. (1995) and DeYoung (2010) describe the evolution of the US banking industry. 
 
iv
 According to DeYoung (2010), around 350 commercial banks were acquired each year during the1980s, 
around 500 each year during the 1990s, and around 300 each year during the first half of the 2000s. More than 
10,000 bank charters were terminated owing to acquisitions (excluding acquisitions enforced by the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation owing to severe financial distress) between 1980 and 2005, and acquisitions 
accounted for more than 80% of all bank charters that terminated during this period. 
 
v
 A number of publications routinely monitor changes in the size distribution and performance of commercial 
banks. For example, the FDIC Quarterly Banking Profile provides a summary of financial results for all FDIC-
insured commercial banks. The Federal Reserve annual publication Profits and Balance Sheet Developments at 
US Commercial Banks examines banks, and not BHC. Several recent analyses of the effects of the financial 
crisis on industry structure focus upon the bank and not the BHC (see, for example, Wheelock, 2011). In 
antitrust cases, policy makers concerned with issues of product and geographic market definition normally 
consider banks, and not BHCs, to be the appropriate unit of analysis (Gilbert and Zaretsky, 2003).  
 
vi
 See JP, p312-4. The credit equivalent is a weighted sum of the following OBS items: financial standby letters 
of credit (weighting = 1.00); performance and standby letters of credit (0.50); commercial standby letters of 
credit (0.25); risk participations in bankers’ acceptances (1.00); securities lent (1.00); retained recourse on small 
business obligations (1.00); recourse and direct credit substitutes (1.00); other financial assets sold with recourse 
(1.00); other OBS liabilities (1.00); and unused loan commitments with maturity greater than one year (0.50). 
Items below the line are usually recorded in notes to the accounts, in supervisory reports, within banks’ internal 
reporting systems, or in some cases not at all. Credit unions typically do not report OBS items. 
 
vii
 Commercial banks’ call reports include a variable which reports (if applicable) the parent BHC code number. 
 
viii
 Banks that form part of a BHC are subject to bank supervision and regulation. For example, they raise 
insured deposits, are subject to risk-based capital regulation and prompt corrective action, and have access to 
lender of last resort facilities via the Federal Reserve discount window. 
 
ix
 The maximised value of the pseudo-log-likelihood function (not reported in Table 1) for (ii) is substantially 
larger than the corresponding value for (i) in every case. 
 
x
 In Figure 3, both the maximum likelihood estimate of the Pareto upper tail, and the Zipf’s Law upper tail, 
commence from the maximum likelihood estimate of the cut-off threshold. 
  
xi
 To avoid a proliferation of similar results, for the loans size measure Table 3 only reports the results without 
the addition of OBS credit equivalents. 
 
xii
 The finding that the upper tail of the log size distribution can be represented by a Pareto distribution reflects 
skewness and kurtosis coefficients for the log size distribution that are persistently higher than the values (of 
zero and three respectively) associated with the normal distribution. This approach, however, leaves open the 
possibility that the entire log size distribution could be represented by some other probability distribution that 
allows for excess kurtosis. The Student-t distribution allows flexibility in modelling excess kurtosis through 
variation in the degrees of freedom parameter. Experimentation with use of the Student-t distribution as an 
alternative to the normal distribution produced similar results for all four log size measures. As before, the 
formulation representing the upper tail of the log size population using the Pareto distribution and the rest of the 
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population using a truncated Student-t distribution was preferred to the formulation representing the entire 
population using a Student t-distribution in every case. However, the threshold values of k that locate the switch 
between the truncated Student-t and Pareto distributions were persistently smaller than the corresponding 
threshold values obtained using the normal and Pareto distributions, as reported in Tables 2 and 3. This pattern 
seems plausible: the Student-t distribution describes accurately a somewhat larger proportion of the upper tail 
than the normal distribution; but neither of these distributions adequately represents the upper tail in its entirety. 
 
xiii
 The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999 removed many restrictions previously imposed on the activities of 
banks. 
 
xiv
 Walter (2006) and Goddard et al. (2009) describe the evolution of the US credit union sector. Wheelock and 
Wilson (2011) present evidence that credit unions are, on average, too small to benefit from economies of scale. 
 
xv
 The largest credit union, Navy Federal with assets of USD 44.2 billion in 2010, would have ranked 36th in the 
distribution of commercial banks by asset size in the same year. 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics: Commercial banks, assets size measure 
 
 Asset size distribution Log asset size distribution 
Year No. Mean CR5 CR10 CR20 HHI Mean S.D. Skew. Kurt. 
A. All commercial banks 
1980 14411 301527 0.210 0.300 0.382 125.6 11.085 1.190 1.057 6.025 
1985 14332 345588 0.166 0.245 0.318 85.7 11.211 1.219 1.115 6.038 
1990 12281 427828 0.135 0.210 0.282 67.8 11.345 1.261 1.213 6.114 
1995 9907 598096 0.180 0.250 0.334 96.4 11.525 1.295 1.279 6.350 
2000 8251 957021 0.282 0.373 0.477 223.9 11.678 1.317 1.302 6.919 
2005 7469 1354382 0.407 0.486 0.569 406.6 11.891 1.340 1.183 6.531 
2010 6480 1851634 0.473 0.555 0.664 552.5 12.034 1.313 1.275 7.328 
B. All commercial banks – including off balance sheet items 
1990 12281 480450 0.154 0.241 0.321 84.7 11.354 1.272 1.254 6.335 
1995 9907 684239 0.199 0.282 0.372 116.3 11.538 1.309 1.323 6.579 
2000 8251 1163547 0.308 0.420 0.540 260.4 11.692 1.332 1.356 7.253 
2005 7469 2133831 0.504 0.626 0.701 706.4 11.913 1.361 1.266 7.116 
2010 6480 3271054 0.629 0.723 0.796 1102.2 12.052 1.329 1.366 8.084 
C. Ownership groups: BHC and independent commercial banks 
1980 12394 456013 0.212 0.306 0.400 133.5 11.021 1.222 1.307 6.857 
1985 11136 444770 0.181 0.269 0.362 110.3 11.150 1.244 1.400 7.398 
1990 9372 560622 0.162 0.255 0.381 110.3 11.279 1.264 1.460 7.605 
1995 7662 773340 0.228 0.344 0.482 169.1 11.465 1.271 1.448 7.882 
2000 6698 1178917 0.361 0.473 0.584 337.2 11.695 1.321 1.334 7.292 
2005 6347 1593805 0.438 0.526 0.625 473.7 11.920 1.357 1.204 6.690 
2010 5800 2068722 0.519 0.603 0.699 662.1 12.083 1.325 1.236 7.186 
D. Ownership groups: BHC and independent commercial banks – including OBS items 
1990 9372 629580 0.179 0.284 0.416 128.0 11.286 1.273 1.499 7.854 
1995 7662 884725 0.245 0.369 0.515 191.3 11.475 1.281 1.491 8.157 
2000 6698 1433327 0.381 0.511 0.635 394.0 11.708 1.334 1.387 7.649 
2005 6347 2511042 0.522 0.647 0.741 763.3 11.941 1.378 1.291 7.315 
2010 5800 3654557 0.655 0.750 0.821 1191.9 12.100 1.341 1.331 7.972 
 
Notes to Table 1 
Results reported in Panels A and C are for balance-sheet assets. Results reported in Panels B and D are for the 
sum of balance-sheet assets and  OBS credit equivalents, calculated in accordance with the method described by 
Janicki and Prescott (2006, pp 312-4). 
Asset size is measured in USD thousands, 2010 prices, conversion using IMF US GDP deflator. 
CR5, CR10, CR20  are the five-, ten- and twenty-firm concentration ratios, respectively. HHI is the Herfindahl 
index.  
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Table 2 Estimation results: Commercial banks, assets size measure 
 
 k (value, percentile) k k k k s(k) CRk K-S 
A. All commercial banks 
1980 609 95.8 10.938 0.957 609223 0.898 0.036 0.719 0.059
**
 
1985 605 95.8 11.058 0.969 752914 0.841 0.034 0.719 0.064
**
 
1990 520 95.8 11.182 0.988 939823 0.767 0.034 0.735 0.073
**
 
1995 611 93.8 11.303 0.947 797323 0.752 0.030 0.803 0.081
**
 
2000 325 96.1 11.515 1.031 1554390 0.704 0.039 0.827 0.074
**
 
2005 267 96.4 11.742 1.081 2113786 0.715 0.044 0.839 0.064
**
 
2010 180 97.2 11.910 1.078 2994218 0.670 0.050 0.856 0.071
**
 
B. All commercial banks – including off balance sheet items 
1990 532 95.7 11.186 0.989 947071 0.754 0.032 0.763 0.073
**
 
1995 655 93.4 11.301 0.941 748830 0.734 0.029 0.830 0.083
**
 
2000 451 94.5 11.484 0.991 1062852 0.705 0.033 0.873 0.075
**
 
2005 354 95.3 11.727 1.054 1586894 0.710 0.038 0.905 0.066
**
 
2010 183 97.2 11.924 1.082 3052227 0.645 0.048 0.917 0.072
**
 
C. Ownership groups: BHC and independent commercial banks 
1980 728 94.1 10.820 0.901 425544 0.773 0.029 0.788 0.075
**
 
1985 504 95.5 10.977 0.937 638739 0.684 0.030 0.818 0.074
**
 
1990 356 96.2 11.122 0.972 950579 0.663 0.035 0.835 0.077
**
 
1995 283 96.3 11.312 0.984 1148926 0.656 0.039 0.874 0.079
**
 
2000 260 96.1 11.534 1.036 1547326 0.694 0.043 0.868 0.070
**
 
2005 220 96.5 11.773 1.098 2290864 0.700 0.047 0.865 0.063
**
 
2010 170 97.1 11.954 1.087 2994218 0.685 0.053 0.868 0.067
**
 
D. Ownership groups: BHC and independent commercial banks – including off balance sheet items 
1990 368 96.1 11.124 0.971 939046 0.658 0.034 0.832 0.078
**
 
1995 287 96.3 11.319 0.986 1159706 0.645 0.038 0.853 0.080
**
 
2000 260 96.1 11.545 1.041 1596308 0.677 0.042 0.880 0.071
**
 
2005 214 96.6 11.793 1.110 2498682 0.668 0.046 0.905 0.065
**
 
2010 172 97.0 11.968 1.092 3021667 0.652 0.050 0.922 0.068
**
 
 
Notes to Table 2 
Results reported in Panels A and C are for balance-sheet assets. Results reported in Panels B and D are for the 
sum of balance-sheet assets and  OBS credit equivalents, calculated in accordance with the method described by 
Janicki and Prescott (2006, pp 312-4). 
k (value) is the fitted threshold rank, below which the log size distribution is truncated normal, and above which 
the size distribution is Pareto. k (percentile) is k (value) expressed as a percentile of the entire size distribution. 
k and k are the mean and standard deviation of the fitted truncated normal distribution for log size (asset size 
measured in USD thousands, 2010 prices, conversion using IMF US GDP deflator). 
k is the fitted threshold asset size (measured in USD thousands). 
k and s(k) are the fitted upper-tail shape parameter in the Pareto distribution, and the standard error of this 
fitted parameter. 
CRk is the k-firm concentration ratio (k defined as above). 
K-S is the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of the null hypothesis that the entire log size distribution is normal.  
**
 denotes rejection of the null at the 0.01 level; 
*
 denotes rejection at the 0.05 level. 
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Table 3 Summary estimation results: Commercial banks, alternative size measures 
 
 Loans Deposits Employees 
 k (value, 
percentile) 
k k (value, 
percentile) 
k k (value, 
percentile) 
k 
All commercial banks 
1980 526 96.4 0.898 572 96.0 0.934 573 96.0 0.927 
1985 534 96.3 0.822 568 96.0 0.880 690 95.2 0.877 
1990 573 95.3 0.768 523 95.7 0.809 588 95.2 0.824 
1995 565 94.3 0.728 614 93.8 0.805 398 96.0 0.806 
2000 341 95.9 0.714 311 96.2 0.754 325 96.1 0.770 
2005 217 97.1 0.724 224 97.0 0.742 266 96.4 0.789 
2010 190 97.1 0.723 185 97.1 0.712 199 96.9 0.800 
          
Ownership groups: BHC and independent commercial banks 
1980 615 95.0 0.760 723 94.2 0.768 529 95.7 0.788 
1985 625 94.4 0.698 601 94.6 0.705 547 95.1 0.722 
1990 398 95.8 0.678 520 94.5 0.701 529 94.4 0.739 
1995 390 94.9 0.681 267 96.5 0.649 264 96.6 0.691 
2000 247 96.3 0.691 265 96.0 0.691 186 97.2 0.695 
2005 195 96.9 0.718 201 96.8 0.697 192 97.0 0.771 
2010 173 97.0 0.737 182 96.9 0.713 130 97.8 0.752 
 
Notes to Table 3 
k (value) is the fitted threshold rank, below which the log size distribution is truncated normal, and above which 
the size distribution is Pareto. k (percentile) is k (value) expressed as a percentile of the entire size distribution.  
k is the fitted upper-tail shape parameter in the Pareto distribution. 
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Table 4 Estimation results: Credit unions, assets size measure 
 
Year Number Mean CR5 CR10 CR20 HHI 0 0 K-S 
All credit unions 
1995 11746 36132 0.061 0.088 0.124 19.2 8.830 1.822 0.007 
2000 10314 53866 0.067 0.096 0.138 21.9 9.141 1.878 0.008   
2005 8691 88071 0.085 0.119 0.165 31.4 9.519 1.939 0.016
*
 
2010 7334 124611 0.108 0.143 0.191 46.5 9.780 2.004 0.018
*
 
 
Notes to Table 4 
0 and 0 are the mean and standard deviation of the fitted normal distribution for log size (asset size measured 
in USD thousands, 2010 prices, conversion using IMF US GDP deflator). 
K-S is the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of the null hypothesis that the entire log size distribution is normal.  
**
 denotes rejection of the null at the 0.01 level; 
*
 denotes rejection at the 0.05 level. 
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Figure 1 Estimation results, upper-tail threshold rank k 
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Figure 2 Estimation results, upper-tail shape parameter k 
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Figure 3  Rank-size plot, assets size measure, all commercial banks  
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(b) 1990 
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Figure 4  Rank-size plot, assets size measure, credit unions, 2010 
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